September 30, 2010
The population sex ratio in the developed nations within Europe and North America is slightly biased toward women (about 50.1% population share). While the natural sex ratio at birth is approximately 105 boys for every 100 girls, the higher mortality rate of young boys eventually leads to a greater number of women. In a striking juxtaposition, countries such as China, India and Taiwan experience a strong masculine sex ratio at birth coupled with a survival disadvantage of young girls, which leads to a relative absence of women in the overall population (48.4% population share).
The preference for sons over daughters has been documented in many East and South Asian societies for at least a century (see Figure 1 for the Indian scenario). We will walk along the meandering course of history to understand the initial social environment responsible for son-preference, some contributing factors that have exacerbated the problem during recent decades, and the public policies that are designed to resolve the crisis.
A handful of studies have attempted to explain the gender imbalance by examining biological factors (e.g. the debate on Hepatitis B as a determinant) affecting the sex ratio at birth. I mentioned one such study in Part 1, which finds evidence on women missing in the adult population in several countries as a consequence of diseases. Most studies, however, focus on prevailing socioeconomic and cultural factors, many intertwined, which drive the preference for sons. In the absence of an effective social safety net (e.g. a retirement plan), sons are perceived as old-age support, a notion reinforced by the prevalence of a joint family structure in which different generations share a common pool of resources. Also responsible is the kinship arrangement that governs marriages and bequests in these societies a married woman generally lives with her husband s family (patrilocal marriage) and parental assets are inherited only by the sons (patrilineal descent). In certain subpopulations, high dowry prices and a rigid caste system discourage households from cultivating an equal view of the two genders. In essence, the higher perceived net worth of boys during the parents lifetime leads to the neglect of young girls and lower adult female empowerment and the cycle perpetuates through future generations. The cultural factors are so deeply ingrained that the remnants are strong even away from home.
Recent structural shifts such as urbanization, industrialization and income growth in these countries while encouraging are not free from idiosyncratic menaces. With rise in income comes a decline in fertility rates, a phenomenon observed across the world (except for some recent evidence from the richest countries). Lower fertility rates are also associated with higher female literacy and autonomy. Surprisingly, none of these shifts have been accompanied by a change in the perceived value of a girl child. The fall in fertility rates brace for the sinking feeling has actually strengthened the preference for sons. With fewer children to be born, boys have become even more prized.
Demographic policies aimed at lowering the fertility rate, then, may have aggravated the gender imbalance problem. The most studied of them the One Child Policy implemented in China in 1979 imposes strict financial penalties on parents in order to prevent a population growth that is disproportionately high compared to available resources. The National Population Policy (2000) of India which abandoned a former regime of highly coercive fertility policies in favor of softer corrective measures shares similar objectives. The Chinese policy has been widely successful in reducing fertility rates from 5.51 births per woman in 1970 to 1.77 in 2008. However, there were additional social prices to be paid. As Ebenstein (2010) argues, the law may have strengthened the preference for sons and led to a more masculine sex ratio. Although not tested, there is no reason to imagine a different outcome for India.
Son-preference is manifested through a household s use of one or more sex-selection techniques. One basic prenatal technique is known as the stopping rule, where parents decide to prevent further fertility after a desired number of boys are born, effectively eliminating the possibility of future girl births. Recent technological advancements allow sex-selection through in-vitro fertilization, but the evidence on its use in these societies is still unclear. Girls are also discriminated postnatally lower investment in their health leads to higher female child mortality rates, and educational neglect translates to worse labor market outcomes in future. Historical evidence from colonial India and early 20th century China suggest the more sinister practice of selective infanticide, but this practice appears to have withered since.
That brings us to the elephant in the room. During the 1970s and 1980s, abortion was legalized in many Asian countries (e.g. 1971 in India, 1985-86 in Taiwan, and never outlawed in China). Within a decade, fetal sex determination techniques such as ultrasound, amniocentesis and villus sampling also found their way into these societies. Aided by a network of private clinics (and in China, public population control officials), the use of portable ultrasound machines provided a cost-effective way of aborting a girl fetus. These services spread at an astonishing pace, even in remote rural areas bereft of basic amenities and electricity. In an infamous anecdote, mobile ultrasound units roamed the rural areas of Northern India, insisting parents to spend a small sum for the abortion service at present time, instead of facing a hefty dowry payment in future. A recent study estimates around 500,000 sex-selective abortions per year in India during the last decade. Another study finds a similar negative effect of the legalization of abortion in Taiwan.
With this evidence in mind, the sharp decline in the juvenile sex ratio in India during the last 40 years (shown in Figure 1) serves both as an indicator of the severe sex-selection problem and a premonition of further gender imbalance in near future.
Policies to alleviate the gender imbalance problem and sex-selective abortion have met with mixed results. Activist groups were rather efficient in identifying and campaigning against selective abortion, but it was not until 1988 when India saw its first legislative action. The Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostics Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, or the PNDT Act, was implemented in the Indian state of Maharashtra, a hotbed of both sex-selection practices and the related activism. A similar law was mandated through the central government for the rest of the country, effective from 1996. The Indian law prevents health service providers from divulging the sex of a fetus to the parents and prescribes various penalties for the infractors. The Chinese government also banned prenatal sex determination (except for the diagnosis of hereditary diseases in the fetus) in 1986. The popular view on these policies is one of an utter failure due to the lack of enforcement. However, demographic policies targeted toward sex-selective abortions remains an area less researched.
General poverty alleviation policies may have an unintended positive effect on the wellbeing of young girls. Conditional transfer programs that directly promote the care of girls, such as the Balika Samridhi Yojana (Girl Child Empowerment Scheme, 1997) and Kishori Shakti Yojana (Adolescent Girls Scheme, 2007) of India are similar in nature. Much of the selective neglect of girls originates from the inadequacy of resources required for the upbringing of children. With free or highly subsidized access to public healthcare and education, households may start taking the girls to a hospital when needed, or send them to school. The resources saved can be reallocated among children, providing better nutrition for everyone.
Often the policymaker proposes but man disposes. Some households always find a way of internalizing an external shock (such as an external ban on abortion through the PNDT Act) and do not respond to the policy. In the context of PNDT, these are the households who would shift resources from other goods and services to purchase the abortions service at a much higher cost. To the consumer-behavior economist s delight, a final group of public policies directly address this concern. Instead of adopting a resistive or an altruistic approach, public awareness campaigns (such as the Save the Daughter Campaign, 2005, of the state government of Gujarat, India) are designed to change the household s utility function and reduce the preference for boys.
There may be light at the end of the tunnel after all. Recent findings from South Korea indicate that economic growth and development along with active policymaking may indeed reduce the extent of son preference and restore the gender balance in Asia. Only time will tell.
References
Hatti, N. and T. V. Sekhar. 2004. Lives at Risk: Declining Child Sex Ratios in India.” Project Lives at Risk: Discrimination of Female Children in Modern India, funded by the Swedish Research Council. Mimeo .
Image Credit: Flickr: emptyhighway
